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EVIDENCE, AND
DOUBT.

Different standards of weight of evidence are imaginable. If
the evidence is testimonial the number of witnesses for or against
can be counted.
Two witnesses swearing to the same fact are
stronger than one of them alone. If the evidence is circumstantial,
six circumstances equally persuasive of the faetum probandum, ?tm
stronger than three of them. The number of the media of persuasion is a measure of their persuasiveness.
In the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, the law seldom
prescribes any particular number of pieces of evidence. -Two witnesses are required by statute, to establish a will. By constitution,
two witnesse3 must prove the same overt act, in prosecutions for treason. One accused of perjury can generally be convicted only on .the
testimony of two witnesses to the untruth of the oath which is alleged to have been perjured, or, on that of one, corroborated by facts
proven by another.. Equities of various sorts, are susceptible of being establidied, to the disadvantage of those having what is called
the "]egal title," only by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one,
fortified by circumstances proven by another.
But, besides difference in respect to the number of the media of
proof, there is a difference in respect to the intrinsic persuasivenes-:
of the same number of media. There are two witnesses. A is mature, observant, careful, free from proneness to exaggeration, truth-
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ful. B is young, immature and untruthful. The statement of A
wins a larger credit than that of B. If the evidence is circumstantial, one circumstance may more cogently than another, persuade of
the primary fact.
In all cases, the so-called burden of proof of some fact rests on
one of the parties. He must furnish some evidence. That evidence
must be relevant, i. e., it must tend to .convince of the fact.um probandum, rather than of other facts. It must also have some cogency,
higher than the lowest. If ,the Judge who presides at the trial
thinks that it does not possess this degree of cogency, he must refuse
to submit the question to the jury. He must think that reasonable
men might on the evidence believe the fact, to establish which the
evidence was tendered; otherwise he must refuse to let the jury return a verdict for the party on whom is the burden of proof. If the
evidence as much tends to prove some other than the fact at issue, as
the fact at issue, (e. g., that a notice to an endorser of the dishonor of
a note, was of the dishonor of note X as that it was of note Y) the
Court must decline to submit it'.

But let us suppose that the party having the burden has fur
pished evidence that is enough, in the opinion of the judge, to warrant a jury's belief of the fact. The opposite party then furnishes
evidence of a contrary tenor. The two bodies of evidence have been
addressed to the same minds, and must be considered and compared
by them. If they leave these minds in a state of equilibrium, if these
minds are unable to say which of the bodies of evidence is the more
persuasive; or if they are able to say that they are equally persuasive, the decision must be against the party who has the so-called burden of proof.2
Suppose, however, the evidence is appreciably stronger on one
side than on the other. Either, alone, might convince, but neither.
contradicted by the other, may be sufficient to convince. Two apparently- credible persons testify affirmatively. One, somewhat more
credible, testifies negatively. The testimony of the two, or of the
one, would have been believed, had it not been contradicted by that
of the one or of the two. It is clear that the evidence may leave the
jury unconvinced, as to which of the assertions, the afirmative or
the negative, is true, although it is conscious that the testimony of
the two is somewhat stronger than that of the one, or vice versa.
Opposing pieces of evidence may leave doubt, although one piece is
stronger'than the other, and doubt is not belief. Doubt "means,"
1

National Bank v. National Bank. 114 Pa. 1.
2Continental Inr. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. 225.
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says Sully,' "a pulling of the mind in two directions, that is, a state
of discord or conflict due to the action of two incompatible and antagonistic thought tendencies (forces of association.) In this
case, it is evident, judgment is altogether arrested, or suspended. It
is this state of doubt or uncertainty, and not that of disbelief, which
is the proper psychological opposite of belief. In belief the mind is
at rest, the impulse to inquire is satisfied, and the volitional activity
involved in thought is quieted. In doubt, on the other hand, we are
in a state of unrest, conflict, or baffled activity."
The text-books and authorities usually inform us that in civil
cases, the decision must be, according to the "preponderance of "evidence." The persuasion necessary, in such cases, says IVigmore, 2 is
"said to be that state of mind in which there is felt to be a preponderance of evidence, in favor of the demandant's proposition." "The
doctrine that a reasonable doubt of guilt is to work an acquittal,
does not apply in civil issues," says Trunkey, J.,3 "in these, the result should follow the preponderance of evidence, even though the
result imputes a crime." "In civil issues," says Wharton,4 when
there are conflicting hypotheses, the judgment must be for that foi
which there is a preponderance of proof."
A corollary from this rule would be that the juror or the judge
must in many cases decide in fayor of A or B, the parties to the
suit, that a fact did or did not occur, although he does not believe
that it occurred or did not occur. A sues B on a note, whose execution B denies. Six witnesses affirm that the signature is in B's
handwriting. Five affirm that it is not. No difference in competence, or trustworthiness, between these witnesses appears. Six
however are more than five. The ordinary man, juror or judge.
would say that the evidence "preponderated" in favor of A's proposition. But would the ordinary discreet man believe that proposi
,tion? Instead of six let us suppose twenty witnesses, and instead
of five, let us suppose nineteen. Still there is a preponderance towards A's contention. But would a sensible man necessarily believe,
that B signed the note, when nineteen men each equallv credible
-with each of the twenty, said that he did not sign it? In such a
state of the- evidence, the prudent and careful man would remain in
IThe Human Mind, Vol. 1, p. 457. Whately's Rhetoric, p. 103.
2Evidence. 3545.
' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Usaw. 112 Pa. 80.
4 Evidence 30. By proof. the author means evidence, presumptions of
law or fact and citations of law:
d.. p. 2. Best soys that the "mere preponderance of probability is decisive in civil cases." Evidence P. 85. But
not everything for which sorne evidence can be adduced. Is prohable: inr
every thing. for which the affirmative evidence is apprcciably stronger than
the negative evidence.
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a state of doubt. He would say there is one-nineteenth more evidence in favor of B's having signed, than in favor of his not having
signed, but I am not convinced that he signed it. I neither believe
nor disbelieve that he signed it.
If the rule quoted is to be adopted, it follows that a verdict ill
a civil case need not, and therefore does not, express the belief, opinion, or conviction of the jury as to the existence or non-existence of
the facts which form the issue, but simply as to the existence of the
preponderance of the evidence, a totally different matter. There
can be evidence that fact X occurred, when it did not occur, and
evidence that fact X did not occur, when it did occur, and, for the
same reason, there can be more evidence that it occurred than that
it did not occur, although it in fact did not occur, and to believe
that there is this greater degree of evidence of occurrence than of
non-occurrence, is not to believe the occurrence, rather than the non.
occurrence.
The rule indicated results in palpable absurdity. The object
of the law is, or ought to be, to secure the sequence of certain results upon certain objective facts. If B signed the note he ought
to be compelled to pay it. It would be, of course, inadmissible to
hold that the absolute certainty of the jury that he signed it, should
be the preliminary to this compulsion. But would it be too much to
hold that the jury should believe, at least in some low degree, that
he signed it? Is not the principle abhorrent that B may be coerced
into paying a suni of money to A, when thejury does not believe.
even in a faint degree, that he promised to pay it, simply because
it believes that, of the plaintiff's and defendant's respective pieces
of evidence, that of the former is heavier than that of the latter?
What those who have laid down the principle that "preponderasce" of evidence will justify and require a decision conformable with it, have failed to realize, is that perception of the preponderance of evidence is quite consistent with want of belief. Of two
pieces of very weak evidence, one may preponderate. It might be
barely enough to convince, had it not encountered the contradictory
evidence. Opposed by the latter, it may be insufficient to generate
even the lowest degree of belief. To detect a preponaerance of evidence that B signed a note, is neither to believe that he signed it,
nor to be logically required to believe that he signed it. It would
be fatuous to affirm that a man ought to believe even faintly, every
thing the evidence for which is, in his opinion, stronger than the
evidence against it.
Sometimes, by some authorities, a distinction is taken between
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different sorts of civil cases; in some, the rule of preponderance
of evidence being laid down, and in others that of belief. Thus
Starkie, J.,1 says: "But in many cases of a civil nature, where the
right is dubious, and the claims of the contesting parties are supported by evidence nearly equipoised, a mere preponderance of evidence on either side may be sufficient to turn the scale. " * * * But,
even where the contest is as to civil rights only, a mere preponderance of evidence, such as would induce a jury to incline to the one
rather than the other, is frequently insufficient. It would be so in
all case3 when it fell short of fully disproving a legal right once
admitted or e-tablished or of rebutting a presumption of law.**
-Ie says that "full proof" of a devise, or of a revocation of an ear..
lier will, must be made. "One who seeks to charge another with a
debt, must do so by full and 3atisfactory proof;" and one who alleges payment of debt must furnish "full proof."
In a considerable number of cases the Courts of this state ru
quire not a preponderance of evidence, but a satisfaction, a convincing of the judge or jury, not that evidence of a fact preponderAn
ate- over evidence against it, but that the fact exists.
eluitable title to land resting in parol can prevail against the legal
title, only when the evidence of. it is "clear, satisfactory in characThe evidence to reform a writing on account
ter and con ring.'"
of nmstake' or to set it aside for fraud must be satisfactory. When
the allegations in a bill in equity are denied by the answer, the proof
must be clear, precise and indubitable. Thee cases hold that a preponderance of evidence, however great, is sufficient to sustain the
burden of proof. The evidence must not only preponderate but it
must convince.
That it were illogical to allow juries in ordinary cases to find
for a party on whom is (he burden of proof, when the evidence does
not convince them even in a feeble degree, of the fact averred by the
party, but in certain other cases to require convincement and even
a considerable degree of it, is palpable, and occasionally the courts,
.without realizing their inconsistency, require conviction in other
cases An example is Howell v. Mellon,6 where the question being
whether certain legatees of the proceeds of a sale of land, whose
conversion was directed by the will, had elected to take the land in
stead of its proceeds, Dean, J., remarks, "All that was necessary
Evidence. p. 817.

Wiilams v. Milligan, 183 Pa. 386.
3 6 P. & L. Dig.. Col. 10277;
4 H-onesdale Glass Co. v. Storms, 125 Pa. 2C8.
&1S9 Pa. 169.

2 Hess v. Callender. 120 Pa. 138;
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was that the weight of the evidence should produce conviction of
the eaistence of the fact.".
There is no measure of the weight of evidence(unless the witnesses or the evidential facts are counted,) other than the feeling of
probability which it generates. If X hearing A aver a certain fact.
and B deny it, believes the fact, or disbelieves it, he, in so doing
appraises the evidence of A -asheavier, or lighter than that of B.
For him, for it to be heavier is for it to produce faith in him. The
rule in all civil cases ought to be that the jury should find agains ,
the party who has the burden, unless it is persuaded, believes, is
convinced, that the facts which he has averred have occurred; an.
less it has passed from a neutral state of doubt into belief. The belief inav be of different degrees, and while the possible degrees arm
innumerable, and cannot be individuated and labeled, there are still
some differences which can be vaguely distinguished from each other. A man may barely believe; he may believe strongly, he may.
be certain. It is not my purpose to investigate the wisdom of re
quirmg some facts to be more strongly proved than others. It
would be difficult, I suspect, to justify the doctrine that, if A sued
B for the malicious killing of her husband C, A would not need to
do more than furnish a preponderance of evidence of the killing
and the malice,' but, if X alleged that a deed was elicited from him
by fraud, or that a stipulation intended to be put in it, was omitted
by mstake, only such preponderance of evidence as generated a satisfaction; as made the fraid or mistake seem "indubitabJe." would avail. The distinction cannot be justified by the
suggestion that the party alleging the fraud or mistake was in some
way reprehensible for it, for it is made in cases in which reprehension of him would be pharisaical.
In criminal cases as in the special civil cases adverted to, the
courts formed the habit of advising jurors not simply to be conscious of a preponderance of evidence of guilt, nor to believe thc
guilt, but to have a "clear impression" of it, to be "satisfied" of it,
before returning a verdict of guilty.2 At length, the admonition
was given that they should have no "rational doubt;" they should
be convinced beyond a "reasonable doubt." "In all criminal case-whatsoever," says Starkie, "it is essential to a verdict of condemnation that the guilt of the accused should be fully proved; neither
a mere preponderance of evidence nor any weight of preponderant evidence, is sufficient for the purpose, unless it generate full belief of the fact to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt."
IFire Ins. Co. v. usaw, 112 Pa. 80;
*Wwrmore. Evidence. 3542.
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In Drum v. Conunonwealth,' Agnew, J., instructed the jury in
a homicide case that they should "give the prisoner the benefit of
any reasonable doubt, arising out of the evidence, which prevents
them from coming to a satisfactory conclusion. But this doubt
must fairly arise out of the evidence, and not be merely fancied or
conjured up. A jury must not raise a mere fanciful or ingeniousi
doubt to escape the consequences of an unpleasant verdict. It must
be au. honest doubt-such a difficulty as fairly strikes a conscien
tious mind and clouds the judgment. If the mind be fairly satisfied of a fact on the evidence-as much so as would induce a man
of reasonable firmness and judgment to take the fact as true, and
to adt upon it in a matter of importance to himself, it would be sufficient to rest a verdict upon it." In an earlier murder case,2 Gibson,
C. J.. told the jury, "You have beei told that to doubt of the prisoner s gii]t is to acquit her. But a doubt, to work an acquittal, musl
be serious and substantial-not the mere possibility of a doubt. If
the evidence convince you of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you
are bound to convict. You are the judges of its effect; and if you
cannot reconcile it to any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, you
may acquit; if not, you are bound to say so."
Two important psychological elements appear in these statements: they are belief and doubt; Doubt as we have seen is the
negation of belief. The question for A is did X strike Y? He
neither believes nor disbelieves, he is in doubt. To advise A to believe beyond a doubt, is to advise iiim simply to believe and possibly
to believe hard. So long as he believes, he does not doubt. His belief may be feeble, it may not have terminated meditation, and it
may vanish on the calling up into distinct consciousness of the contradictory evidence, or on the more critical examination of the evidence which has evoked the belief. If the admonition to the jury
means that the belief of guilt should be strong and not weak, tenacious and pertinacious, despite repeated reflection on and analysis
of the evidence, and despite the realization of the gravity of a verdict of guilty. it is intelligible. But the phraseology employed i,
scarcely to be commended for perspicuousness. What is a "reason-"
able doubt?" The advice is directed to the juror. He must have
the doubt and he must be the critic of it. He is to say whether it i.,
reasonable. But what man ever entertained a doubt, which at the,
time. he believed to be unreasonable? To be convinced that a doubt
of a fact is unreasonable, is to believe the fact. To tell a man thai:
1 58 Pa. 9.

2Com. v. Harman, 4 Pa. 269.
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if he believes beyond a reasonable doubt, he must do so and so, is to
tell him that if he believes beyond reasonably not believing, he is
to do so and so, a valuable instruction surely!
The doubt is to arise out of the evidence, Why so? Before the
juror has heard a syllable of the evidence, he doubts, he is instructea'
to doubt, the guilt of the accused. ie is told in odd phrase that
innocence is to be presumed. Suppose that initial doubt persists.
despite the evidence. Will it arise ovt of the evidence? Must the
juror say guilty, because his still present doubt is a mere continuation of the doubt with which he began ?
Is it true that the doubt must arise out of the evidence? A man
experienced with nature and with men, brings in his consciousness
to th3 trial, a store of knowledges, which are tests of the credibility, the probability of the testimony of witnesses, or of the
inferences to be drawn from circumstances. The doubt lingering
in his mind, after the evidence has been concluded, may be pr6 .
duced by the application of these subjective criteria to it.. Is such
a donbt illegitimate?
The doubt must not be fancied or conjured up, but must arise
oit of the evidence. To fancy'a man is to form a mental picture of him, to imagine him. Are we to understand that to fancy
a doubt is to do the same thing forthe doubt, as is done for the man
A fancied doubt, is a doubt which dces not exist, but which is pictured. imagined. To tell the juror not to indulge in a fancied
doubt, is to tell him not to form pictures of doubt, and let thee pictures of doubt, these unreal doubts, limit, bound, qualify, real belief of the guilt of the prisoner. k sapient instruction surely!
A conjured up doubt! What is that? Is it a doubt? If it is,
like all other facts, pyschological or physical, it has causes, What
kind of causation is it, that these magical words "conjured up" art
designed to indicate? Ierhaps they are explained by the followin.
words: raise. A juror must not raise, etc. He must not raise a fan.
ciful doubt. Doe3 this mean, form in his mind an image of doubt,
imagine a doubt? He must not raise an ingenious doubt? Why
not. What is the objection to the ingenuity of the doubt? Some
ingenious cross-examinations have been invaluable, in the eliciting
of truth. We cannot see a piiori, why doubts should be condemned
because they are ingenious. Is the palm to be given to dull, common-place, stupid doubts? Is the doubt that visits only the rarely
sagacious, experienced and acute mind to be condemned, because it
does not frequent also minds of another class? An ingenious doubt
may be often a very sensible one.
-
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But the doubt must not be "'raised" for a particular purpose.
viz., to escape the consequence3 of an unpleasant verdict; that is.
apparently the juror must not dishonestly refuse to consider all the
evidence, with the so!e purpose of ascertaining the facts; he must.
not allow his contemplation to be warped by a desire to avoid, for
whatever reason a verdict of guilty. Considered as a direction to
the jury to weigh the evidence dispassionately, without bias, and
without desire to reach a verdict of not guilty, the only objection to
it is,'that it does not embrace the caution against trying to reach a
verdict of guilty.
The doubt must be an "honest doubt." Doubt is a state of nonbelief. The honesty in view, is probably, not so mu~h a property
of the doubt, as of the mind that has it. The dishonest doubt is the
doubt which results from the dishonest mental manipulation of the
evidcnce; dwelling on some, ignoring or slighting others, with :1
view. not to reach the fact, but to reach a pre-determined verdict.
The aoubt we are told is such a difficulty as fairly strikes the
conscientious mind and clouds the judgment. A truly remarkable
doubt, indeed! It is now, not a doubt, but a difficulty. A difficulty
is an obstacle of some sort, to the reaching of an end, a desired end,
or an cnd whether desired or not. But this is a difficulty which does
two weird things, it strikes, and it clouds. It strikes a mind, and
not a bad mind, be it noted, but a conscientious mind. The juror
must have a conscientious mind, and then it must be struck by a
difficulty, and if this difficulty is :,doubt, the doubt will be honest,
and the juror need not find the prisoner guilty. The difficulty also
must, cloud the judgment. The judgment seems to be conceived as
a landscape and the difficulty causes clouds to hang over it; or it is
conceived as an eye, or a spy-glass, and vision is rendered obscure
by clouds before it.
If the juror's mind is fairly satisfied of a fact on the evidence,
so far convinced, that a conviction of an equal degree of strength,
would induce the juror to take action in matters of importance to
himself he would be justified in returning a verdict of guilty. This
is a totally different criterion. Ihere may be a satisfaction based
on the evidence, that the defendant is guilty. This satisfastion mav
be so strong that an equally strong satisfaction would be acted upon by the juror in a matter of importance to himself. This criterion
is extremely vague. There are many degrees of importance, and
many kinds of matter of importance. 33ut. how few of them ought
to be regarded as of equal importance with the act by which a fellow man is stigmatizes as a crhnimnl, and deprived of his property,
his liberty, or his life?

THE

FORUM

Instruction of the sort under review if obeyed, would lead to
the performance of some singular mental operations. The juror
must imagine some important a1fairslof his own. I-Ie must conceive
that they would be affected in sonic way by the guilt of the accused,
and he must discover that, in the hypothetical condition, he would
take an important resolution if hz believed the guilt of the accused
as strongly as he now actually believes it. He must do more. He
must imagine himself-as, of course, all jurors do.-to be a man of
reasonable firmness and judgment. With this reasonable and usual
self-esteem, and with an imagination for his affairs, and a vaticinai
visiol of what his volition would be, in the imagined conjunctures,
he is in a situation to sit as critic upon his belief and say whether
he ought-to incorporate it into a verdict.
What has been said suffices to suggest the uselessness of such
instructions as are found in the phrases of Justice Agnew.
J. Gibsoii tells the jury that they must convict if the evidence convinces beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction and doubt
are two inconsistent states of mind. If the jury is convinced, it
does not doubt, reasonably or unreasonably; if it doubts it is no,
convinced,. Possibly what is meant is, if the conviction or persuasion gives signs of firmness, of not lapsing into doubt on further reflection, or more critical siftin.g of the evidence, the verdict must
be g-oilty. How long the critical process of rumination must last,
a day, an hour, fifteen minutes, we do not know. The jury must.
from the strength of their opinion, guess that it would resist the
onset of argument and criticism of the evidence, and thus guess that
it is beyond reasonable doubt. Perhaps what is meant is that the
jury must believe the guilt of the accused and must further believt
that no man, hearing the same evidence, and fitly considering it:
would doubt. In either case, the jurors are invited to speculate a.
to the persistence of their own opinion, or as to the opinions of
other minds, related as theirs are to the same evidence.
AV statement of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts has been
not infrequently quoted by Judges.i The jury is to render a ver.
dict of guilty, if it believes the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And this is the explanation of a reasonable doubt It
is "that state of the case which, after the entire comparison anei
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the mind of jurors in tha
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.* * * * The evidence

must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral cer
It .is quoted in Com. v. Devine. 18 Superior, 431.
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taintyv,--certainty that convinces and directs the understanding anei
satisfies the reason and judgment. * ** This we take to be proof be
yond a reasonable doubt!"
The doubt is a state of the case! I had imagined that it was a
state of the mind. The state of the case, viz., the state of the evi
dence in the case, leaves the jurors' minds in a condition: What
condition? This, viz., that they cannot say, that they have a conviction. I suppose that, if they cannot say that they have a convic
tion, it is because they have not the conviction. What conviction?
It is an abiding conviction. But, what is that? One that has
abode, for a considerable time, or one that is going to abide? How
long before rendering the verdict must the conviction expressed by
it have been formed? A week, a day, an hour, five minutes? If thE
abidingness is future, by what faculty does the juror know that it
is going to abide? By what quality of the conviction does he rec
ognize its longevity? By its stren,th? By its defiance of past argument in the jury-room? Who knows? But, it is a conviction tj
a moral certainty. Is the certainty a different state of mind from
the conviction, or is the phrase used to mean, a conviction which is
a certainty, that is, a very strong conviction? It would be hypercritical to challenge the usage which speaks of a moral certainty.
but it is impossible to see how an ordinary juror is to be aided by
being told that if he is morally certain of the prisoner's guilt, he is
to convict him.
Chief Justice Shaw then substantially informs us that a reasonable doubt is the absence of an abiding moral certainty, That is,
We had supposed
all shades of belief below certainty are doubt,!
that doubt was the absence of belief. It seems now, in Shaw'spsychology, that doubt is the absence only of a high belief; a reason
able doubt is the absence of capacity of the mind to say that it hai
an abiding conviction which is a certainty; that is, is the absenc,
of ai- abiding conviction which is a certainty. A remarkable revelation surely!
In order to convict, we are further told, the evidence must pro
duce a moral certainty of the guilt. But this certainty has somtvery peculiar powers. It convinces, and it directs the understand
ing, it satisfies the reason and judgment. Certainty is the state oi
being convinced, but, in Shaw's philosophy, it is the cause of, an, i
therefore different from, the conviction. A moment ago, there wa4
"an abiding conviction to a moral certainty" but now it is a certainty generating a conviction! This certainty, which is not a
state. but an actor, a cause, has seemingly, three subjects on which
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to operate. There is an understanding; there are a reason and a.
judgment! Or are these three aames only for one thing? But, that
caimot be, for the operations are different. The certainty convinces
and directs the understanding. It does no such thing for the rea
son or the judgment. Its function is, respecting these, humbler
shall we say, or more exalted? It "satisfies" the reason and judgment! A certainty satisfies! The certainty that one has fallen heir
to a million dollars "satisfies" but it does not satisfy the reason:
only the cupidity, the desire for happiness; The certainty that X.
the defendant killed Y, satisfies the reason! What is this strang.,
elusive thing called satisfaction of the reason? And what singular
thing is reason, that it should be satisfied by a certainty that the defendant has committed an atrocious crime? Perhaps what is satisfled is the desire to find out who committed it, that is, the official
curiosity of the jurors for which "reason and judgment" are odd
namtes.
Doing the best possible with Chief Justice Shaw's phrases, all
that can be got out of them is this: Before convicting of a crime
a juror should be morally certain, that he committed it, and this
conviction should be the result of a serious consideration of all the
evidence.
Prof. Wigmore well says, in his noble work on Evidence, l
"When anything more than a simple caution and a brief definition is given, the matter tends to become one of mere words,, and
the actual effect upon the jury. instead of being enlightenment, is
mere confusion, or, at least, i continued incomprehension."
1

Vol. 4. p. 3543.
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MOOT COURT
WM. STALEY vs. JEROME JACOBS.

Contracts-Specific

Performance-Tender-Bona

Fide

Purchaser-When

Time is of the Essence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Jacobs agreed in writing to convey a farm to Staley, who agreed
therein to pay $2500 for it on April 1st, 1905.
The writing also stipulated that if Staley should not pay at that time,
the agreement was to be void.
Despite this agreement, John Jacobs conveyed the farm to Jerome
Jacobs; on March 1st, 1905.
Staley omitted to tender the money to John or Jerome until April 2nd,
when he tendered it to both, demanding a deed.
They refused to receive it or make the deed.
This is a bill for specific performance of the contract.
Barner for the complainant.
A contract for the sale of real property raises an Implied trust In favor of the vendee which will be enforced against subsequent purchasers
with notice of the prior contract of sale. Tiedeman on Real Property, Sec.
498; Baum vs. Dubois, 43 Pa. 260; Hamory vs. Sargent, 25 Pa. C. C. R.
191.
Showalter for the respondent.
Specific performance will not be decreed in favor of a party who has
slept on his rights. Due diligence Is necessary to call the court Into action
Pnd where it does not exist, a court of equity will not lend its assistance.
Parrish v. Koons, 1 Parsons 79;
Doinert's Appeal, 64 Pa. 31; Oxford vs.
Thomas, et al., 160 Pa. 80.
Time Is essential if the contract is to be void, If the fulfilment Is not
within the prescribed time. Reed vs. Breedon, 61 Pa. 460; Barnard vs.
Lee, 97 Mass. 92.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BRADDOCK, J.-Thnls is a bill for specific performance by Staley
against Jerome Jacobs, who is the vendee of John Jacobs, the last named
being the man with whom Staley had a' writing purporting to convey a farm
to him for the sum of $2500.
The agreement was to be void if money was not paid on April 1st, 1905.
John Jacobs conveyed to Jerome Jacobs on March 1, 1905. Staley tendered
April 2nd. Tender refused by both. We are of the opinion this bill should
be dismissed for the following reasons, viz:

88

THE

FORUM

1. Bill does not allege that Jerome Jacobs was not a bona fide purchas,
er, if he was a bona fide purchaser he 1nok land stripped of the equities with
which it was burdened while in Joan Jacobs' hands. If he was not a bonai
fide purchaser specific performance may be had in Pennsylvania. Riel v.
Gannon, 161 Pa. 289; Coolbaugh v. Ransberry, 23 Super Ct. 97.
But proof must be had that purchaser knows of contract for sale of
land in controversy.
2 The complainant Staley did not tender money until day after April 1,
1905, the day upon which agreement was to expire, therefore, he is guilty
of laches. Granted that time is not o the essence of contracts when land
is in question, yet in Reed vs. Breeden, 61 Penna. 460, an agreement wag
made for sale of land, part of hand money to be paid on delivery of deed"
deed was executed, vendee paying part of hand money, deed then left with
an attorney with agreement that if remainder of hand money was not paid
at an appointed time all negotiations .abould end. Held, time was essence of
contract.
Here we have an agreement specifying April 1, 1905 as the day upou
which money should be tendered an'i no other day. It does not matter
surely whether a deed was placed in hands of an attorney or not.
3. No relationship o vendee to vender is shown, this fact might tend
to show fraud but is not set forth.
John Jacobs put it out of his pawer to convey before April 1, 1905. But
that fact alone does not give Stalky action for specific performance against
Jerome Jacobs. Let the complainant seek his remedy at law.
5. When evidence is uncertaip- no decree can be entered. Fussell v.
Rhodes, 2 Phila. 165.
And now, it is decreed by the Court that this Bill be dismissed with
the costs placed on the complainant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The agreement was that Staley sh:'uld pay the price of the land, $2500,
on April 1st, 1905, and that if he did aot pay at that time, the agreement
should be void. Ordinarily, time is not treated as of the essence of the contract, to use an oft recurring but vague phrase. But the parties may directly
show by their language, that they intend to make it of the essence, and no
words could more clearly express this ".nterest, than those employed by the
plaintiff and the defendant.
It is no more the inclination of the chancellor than of the common law
judge, to deny the contractual power of persons sui juris except in a few
fairly well defined circumstances. Staley agreed that he should have no
right to a conveyance, and on the other hand should be discharged from the
duty tc: pay the $2500, If he did not Lender the money before or on April 1st,
1905. This was one of the considerat!ons for Jacobs' undertaking at all, to
make the conveyance. Their contract must be respected. 19 P. & L. Dig.
Dec. 32805; Vito v. Birkel, 209 Pa. 206.
The tender was made on April 2nd, one day too late. Lateness by one
day, as much avoids the contract, as lateness by a thousand days. At the
close of the first day of April, the contract had, according to its terms, become void; the obligation of it had ceased. Then could tender, later, effect

THE

FORUM

89

a revivification of it? In Penna. Mining Co. v. Martin, 210 Pa. 49, it was
said that an option to buy land within nine months from June 17th, 1899,
would be terminated, by the lapse of March 17th, 1900, without the exercise
,of it.
Jacobs conveyed the land to Jerome a month before the expiration of
the time within which Staley's contraet required him to tender the money.
This he had a right to do, provided that he gave notice to Jerome of his contract with Staley. Jerome would then take the land subject to Staley's right.
But Staley's right would not be enlarged. It would be his duty to make the
tender before or on April 1st, if he desired to receive a conveyance.
If Jerome was not apprised of Staiey's contract, his estate, acquired by
the conveyance, was discharged from Staley's equity. Specific performance
would now be -impossible.
Appeal dismissed.

JOHN CURZON, ADM'R. vs. JAS. LEITER.

Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment-Presumption of Payment On a
Bond-Evidence,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Leiter gave to his father in 1880 for money borrowed, a bond for $2003,
payable in 1881, with warrant of attorney to confess judgment. The bond
has on it endorsements that interest for each year to 1890 have been paid.
These were written by the fathcr, who died in 1901:when the bond was more
than 20 years due. The father's will devised that the bond be deducted front
the share of Jas. Leiter in his estate. His astate is only $500, except the
bond. The wldow claims against the will. A petition is filed by Curzon.
Adm'r., for leave to enter judgment -on the confession. The defendant in his
answer alleges that he paid the interest to 1890 and that in 1891 he paid the
prinei]pal. He offers to show that he ras fully able to pay from 1890 on;
that hic father was in failing circumstances, often borrowing money from
other parties.
FlanaGan for the petitioner.
The evidence was inadmissible under clause e, Sect. 5, of Act of May
23, 1887.
Laub for the respondent.
Indorsements upon a sealed Instrument, or bond, of payments on account, or of intdrest paid, signed by the obligee are insufficient to rebut
+he presumption of payment, unlessihey are proved affirmatively to have
been made before the presumption of rayment had ripened;
and this
though they are dated prior to the expiration of that period.
Cremer's
Est. 5 W. & S. 331; I4st v. VonNeida, 109 Pa. 207; Rummer's Appeal,
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121 Pa. 648; Hart v. Beecher, 182 Pa. 604; Hart v. Beecher, 186 Pa. 384.
Where evidence has beengiven tending to rebut the presumption of payment, evidence tending to strengthen the presumption is admissible. Van
Devereuxs
Loon v.. Smith, 103 Pa. 238; Huges v. Hughes, 54 Pa. 240;
Estate, 184 Pa. 433.
OPINION Ol1THE COURT.
McALEE, J..-This is a petition filed by John Curzon, administrator of
Jas. Leiter, deceased, for leave to enter judgment on a bond with warrant
of attorney to confess judgment attached.
In 1880, the defendant Leiter, gave to his father for money borrowed,
a bond for $2000 payable in 18S1, with warrant of attorney to confess judgment. The bond had on'it endorsements that interest for each year up. to
1890 had been paid. These were written by the father who died In 1901,
when the bond was then more than 20 years due. The father's will devised
that the bond be deducted from the share of James Leiter in his estate. His
estate was only $500 except the bond. The widow claimed against the will.
Hence this petition by the administrator to enter judgment on the confes.
sion.
The defence resists the entry of.the judgment on two grounds: first that
the debt was paid by the defendant to his father in 1891; second that more
than twenty years have elapsed since the bond became due.
To support the first proposition that the debt was paid by the defendant
to his father in 1891, the evidence is very meagre. The defense produces no
witnesses who saw the bill paid. No receipt was put in evidence. The mere
allegation of the defendant is not sufficient to establish the fact of payment
of the money to his father as under clause (e) of the act of 1887, he is pre.
clude4d. The defendant clearly has failed to establish the fact of the payment of the bond in 1891.
The legal presumption of payment arising from the lapse of twenty
years in the case of a specialty or bot.-d does nothing more than shift t-he
burden of proof. Devereux's Estate 184 Pa. 429. Within twenty years the
law presumes that the debt has remained (inpaid, and throws the burden
of proof upon the debtor. After twenty years the creditor is bound to show,
by something more than !is bond, that his debt has not been paid, and thihe may do, because the presumption raises only a prima facie case against
him. The presumption therefore is not conclusive. However each case must
be decided on its own peculiar facts. If nothing had been done to the bond
since 1880, then clearly the burden of proof vwould be upon the administrator
to prove the fact of non-payment and under the' facts of the case the petition would be dismissed. But the presumption of payment from lapse of
time may be rebutted by any facts which go to destroy that presumption.
This presumption is extinguished by an intermediate acknowledgment of
the obligor that the debt or debt is still due and unpaid or by part payment
of the principal or the payment of interest within twenty years or by tha
Gregory v. Comm.. 131 Pa. 611.
commencement of legal proceedings.
The defendant admits in his answer Lhat he paid the interest on the bond
up to the year 1890. It is laid down in Gregory v..Comm., supra, that all
debts unrecognized for twenty years, h 'the absence of sufficien.t explanation,
are presumed to have been paid. Clearly this payment of the interest on the
bond is such a recognition of the debt up to 1890 as to rebut the presumption
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of payment and put the burden of proof upon the defendant to show that
the debt has been paid. The presumption would not arise until twenty years
after the last payment of interest.
The defendant cffers evidence to show that he was fully able to pay
the debt from 1890 on; that his father was in failing circumstances, often
borrowing money from other parties. This evidence is admissible, having
been so held in Hughes v. Hughes, 54 Pa. 240 and Devereux's Estate 184 Pa.
433. But in these cases it was decideu that the ability of the obligor to pay
and the pressing need of the obligee for money have been recognized as
circumstances which aid the presumption of payment." It does not conclusively establish the fact of payment. But as the burden of proof is on
the defendant to show that the debt has been paid, the mere fact that the
obligor was able to pay and the obligee in need of money would not of itself
establish the fact of payment. The relation of the parties-father and son,
the father while in need of money, would not press his son for the payment
of his bond, even if the obligor had been able to pay. It is not conclusive
that because a person has money he will pay his debts. However If an
obligor never had any money, it would be strong ev!dence that he did not
ray, but the converse would. not be true nor would the evidence be so
strong.
Therefore as the defendant has failed to prove that the debt has been
paid, to the satisfact.ion of the court, the petition to enter judgment on
the confession is allowed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
This is a petition for leave to enter judgment on the warrant of attorney. The bond has been payable more than twenty years. The rule of
court of Cumberland Ounty, p. 42, directs that "when the Instrument is
above twenty years old, there must be a rule to show cause served on the
defendant, if he be found within the. county." The rule has been served, and
cause has been shown by the defendant why the judgment should not be
entered.
The first position assumed by the defendant, is, that the lapse of mor'e
than twenty years until the bond became payable, furnishes a presumption
than twenty years since the bond became payable, furnishes a presumption
question is, has it been rebutted?
There are endorsements of prayments of Interest, for each year to 1890;
They are In the hand-writing of the obligee. Had they clearly appeared to
have been written at the dates mentioned in them, they would have been
evidence of the payments, for Leiter, the obligee, Is now dead, and
the making of them would have been aga!r.st his Interest. He died In 1901
and, se far as appears, after the expirnion of twenty years from the maturity of the bond. He may have made them. after that expiration. If he did
they tended to promote his interest, for if receivable in evidence, they con
stituted evidence by which the whole principal of the debt would be made
now collectible. As the date mentioned in the endorsement Is not receivable as rroof that it was the true date of the endorsement, and there is no
other indication when it was made, we cannot know that It was against the
intercst, of the obllgee, and hence, we. cannot receive it as evidence
The presumption of payment stands, despite the endcrsements.
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It is urged however, that the obligee has, by his will, converted the debt
into an advancement. The will dir.2cts that the bond be subtracted from the
obligor's share of his estate. This is precisely what the law would do, if the
bond continued to be a valid debt. A direction in the will to do the same,
will not convert a debt into something else. Had the estate been large
enough to make James' share equal t, the bond, then the retention of that
share would pay the bond. The estate. incuding the bond, is but $2500; of
which the widow is entitled to one thlid, viz., $833.33. There would remain,
for James, the only child, but $1666.67.
The widow claims against the will. At the instant of the testator's
death, the $2500 was a part of his estate; an enforceable chose in action
As an ordinary bequest or devise would be inoperative against a recusant
widow, so a testamentary conversion of a debt into an advancement would
be. An advancement is a species of gift, and against the widow, the testator
can no more dispose of his property, . the form of a debt, by making it an
advancement, than by giving it unconditionally. The will has not extinguished the bond.
Is there any evidence to overcome the presuimption of payment? The
defendant himself admits that he paid interest to 1890, thus corroborating
the endorsements on the bond. The principal was then unpaid in 1890, and
only fifteen years has run since then
The defendant in his answer, alleges that he raid the principal in 1891;
and he avers his ability to pay, from 1890 on; the failing circumstanceg
of his father, etc. This rule is to be disposed of on petition and answer. The
answer does not disclose that the proof of paymicnt in 1891 is to be made
only by the defendant himself, a generally incompetent witness, nor if i2
were would it be manifest that something might not happen which would
restore nis competency, or that objeiuon to his incompetency might not be
waived.
Enough we think is made to appear by the answer of the defendant to
require the decivion of a jury. For that reason the allowance of the entry
of the judgment was erroneous.
Order set aside with prcedendo.

BOSLER vs. MATTHEWS.

8ale-Fraud-Misrpresentation of Vendee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thomas Horn had a voice much resembling that of David Mattnews
Basler is a wholesale wool merchant cf h!gh standing. Horn is a man who
lived by his wits. Horn telephoned to Basler asking quotations on wool and
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after some conversation, during which he Impersonated David Matthews
he otrdered a thousand pounds of wool sent to No. 10 Broadway, the addre.3s
of Matthews. Horn was on hand when the wool arrived and told the drayman to put the wool on the pavement He then went within and sold the
wool to David Matthews and departed with the money. Bosler later sent
the hill to Matthews .wif- repudiated the idea of a contract with Bosler.
Bosler sues for the wool.
Smith for the plaintiff.
Sale of goods by one who tortiously gets them without the owner's consent vests in the purchaser no title to them as against the owner. Barker
vs. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427.
When a person through false represontations as to his Identity induces
another to sell and deliver goods to him, there is in fact no contract and no
title rasses; and the goods may be recovered though in the hands of an innocent third party. Pecan vs. Shipper, 35 Pa. 239.
Lewis for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KEENAN, J.:-The result of this case will undoubtedly be a hard one
whichever way it may be decided. One of two innocent parties must suffer
by the fraud and knavery of a practised swindler, who had no authority to
act for either of the parties to this acion. Still the case must be fairly and
justly decided, and as preced nts exist, our conclusions must be based on
them.
From the undisputed evidence arising in this case a gross fraud hai
been perpetrated by this man Horn, who representing himself to be Matthews, telephoned to Bosler and ordered one thousand pounds of wool to be
sent to Matthews' address, No. 10 Broadway. Horn was on hand when the
wool was delivered and told the drayman to put the wool on the sidewalk,
which was done and then Horn went within and sold this same wool to Matthews and departed with the money h. received. Later Bosler sent a bill to
Matthews, who refused to pay, whereupon Bosler brought this suit of replevin to recover the wool.
The main question now to be determined is, on whom shall the loss
fall, cn the plaintiff or on the defendant? This is a mixed question, composed partly of law which is for the Court to determine and partly of fact,
which is for the jury.
'The general Pennsylvania rule is as laid down in Barker v. Dlnsmore,
72 Pa 427, that no man can be divesteJ of his property without his own consent and voluntary act. Are these qualities here present? We think noBosler sold the goods to Matthews, as he thought, and not to this adventurer, Horn, whose voice was similar to that of Matthews, Bosler did not Intend to sell this wool to this man Horn as an individual on his own responsibility, but he did intend to hold Matthews responsible. It was Horn's imperscnation of Matthews, also the res!mblance between the two voices that
Induced Bosler to sell the goods, which were ordered to be delivered to,
Matthews' accustomed place of business. This, we judge, was the usual
method of transacting such business and nothing Is apparent, that would
have put the plaintiff on his guard He knew that Matthews was engaged in
the wool busincss, probably had dealigs with him before, so that when the
above order was telephoned to him, he had no hesitancy In filling it. What
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was he to do to make his position more secure? Was he to visit Matthews
vnd see him face- to face and obtain a verbal confirmation of the order, or
should he have waited until a forma' signed order was delivered to him?
We think that Bosler did everything consistent with good business judgment and law. On the other hand did Matthews display sound business actimen? Was it customary for him to bny wool from any Tom, Dick or Harry
who deposited it on the street and then was anxious to sell it to him, without having had an order for the wool, and without the knowledge on Matthews' part whether or not the "sidewalk merchant," or vendor was a dealer
in wool? Had he exercised a reasonable amount of precaution he would.
have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transaction.
As it is apparently plain that Bosler did not intend to sell this wool to
Horn. the latter could not pass any better title that he himself took. There
was no meeting of minds, because Bosler Intended to sell to Matthews and
not to Horn, who actually received the wool. Still he only received possession of the wool and not the property in the wool. Had he obtained both
the possession and the property this bona fide purchaser would have beea
protected. Sinclair v. Healy, 40 Pa. 417; Levy v. Cooke, 143 Pa. 607.
Matthews' position in this case is no stronger than that of a bona fide
purchaser for value from a thief. Horn obtained possession of this wool
through fraudulent representation, and Barker v. Dinsmore, supra, expressly holds that the sale of goods by one who has tortiously obtained their
possession, without the consent of the owner, vests no title to them in the
purchaser as against the owner.
The New York citation, Paddon v. Taylor, 44 N. Y. 371 upon which the
defendant's counsel bases his defense is not applicable to this case, because
the Penna. Courts have not adopted tlie rulings of the New York courts in
this i espect.
On the evidence, gentlemen of the jury, your verdict should be for the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Horn was not the agent of Matthews, when he ordered the wool. He
did not subsequently, represent himself to Matthews, to have bought the
wool as agent of the latter. Matthews supposed himself to be buying the
wool from Horn. There was then, n.a ratification of any agency, not previously authorized, of Horn.
Horn, however, intended that Bosler should understand that he was
Matthews. His telephone voice was like that of Matthews, as he knew, anI
he intended by means of the resemblance, to impose on Bosler. He als3
explicitly pretended, in the telephone conversation, to be Matthews. He in.
tended Bosler to think, he knew that Bosler thought, in fact Bosler did think,
that he was negotiating with Matthews. Bosler was not in fact, negotiatin.1
with Matthews. The delivery of the wool was in execution of a supposed
contract with Matthews. There was no real contract. The ownership of
the wool did not pass to Matthews.
Nor did the ownership pass to Horn. Horn was unknown to Bosler;
who intended to have, and believed that he was having dealings with him.
A mistake as to the personality with whom one is dealing vitiates the con.
tract; Clark Contracts, 200. It Is, not voidable merely but void. As the wool

THE

FORUM

did not become Horn's, he could not validly sell it to Matthews. No ownership passed to Matthews, whether directly from Bosler, or circuitously
through Horn. Clark, Contracts, 201, 239; Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427.
It follows that the goods can be recovered In this replevin, by Bosler.
The fact that possession, was given to Horn, and that he was thus enabled
to impose on Matthews, does not destroy by estoppel the ownership of Bosler.
We cannot say nor should a jury be allowed to say that that should be the
consequence of dealing with a man by telephone. It would be as wise to
make one who is deceived by simulated writing bear the loss, as one deceived by simulated voice. If Horn had written a letter using the name, and
imitating the handwriting of Matthews and had thus deceived Bosler, Bosler
would not estop himself from reclaiming the goods, because, transacting the
business by mail, he had waived the evidences of authenticity that a personal interview would haye furnished. Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cases 465:
Neither would he estop himself by negotiating by telephone.
A car. make a bailment to B of a horse, or other chattel, without exposing himself to the loss of the property if B should fraudulently sell it to C
who, finding B in pos3csslon, inferred that he was the owner.
I is not yet established that a thief can pass an Indefeasible title to a
bona fide purchaser from him, because the theft was facilitated by the unsusplciousness or negligence of the owne.
Judgment affirmed.

MUNSING'S ESTATE.

Decedent's Estate-Appointment of Minor as Executor-Right of Guardian
'To Act as Executor.-Appeal from the Register.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A. H. Munsing died leaving a will in which he named his minor son, L.
Munsing, aged eighteen years. sole executor. After various devises and bequests, the testator divides the residue of his estate among his four sons,
of whom the above, L. Munsing, is one. The others are all of age and join
in petitioning the register to prant letters of administration during minority
to the eldest. This Is objected to bythe guardian of the minor executor who
claims the right of administration in behalf of his ward. The register issues
letterg to the eldest son. Hence this appeal.
Clark for the Appellant.
Lindley for the Appellee.
No executor or administrator shall be admitted or appointed by the Orphans' Court. guardian of a minor having an interest in the estate under
the care of such executor or administrator. P. & L. Col. 1505. Rhone vol.
II, P. 235, Note.
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The right to administer is predicated upon the ground of interest in
the estate as heir, legatee or creditor. Ellmaker's Estate. 4 Watts, 34.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DUFFY,J.:-The 23rd section of the Act of 1832 reads: "Whenever all
the executors named !n any last will and testament, or all the persons entitled, as kindred, to the administration of any decedent's estate, shall happen to be under the age of twenty-one years, it shall be -lawful for the Register to grant administration as afore.,aid to any fit person or persons subject nevertheless to be terminated at the instance of any of the said minors
who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years."
The report of the commissioners who prepared the code of 1832 referring to the foregoing section, contains the following: "The guardians of
persons under the age of twenty-one years, When such are the only person,?
entilled to le tters iestamen.tary , of administrationwnde r the preceding section,
are invested with the right to administer during the minority of their wards.
2 Rhene 294. Note B.
The "preceding section" referred to is section 22 of the same act, which
reads in part: "That in all cases of az administr ation, with a will annexed
where there is a general residue of the estate bequeathed, the right to administer shall belong to those having the right to such residue, and the administration in such cases shall be granted by the register to such one or
more of them as he shall judge will best administer the estate."
The sixth section of the Act of Mar. 29th, 1832 provides: "That no executor or administrator shall be admitted or appointed by the orphans' courc
guardian of a minor having an interest in the estate under the.care of such
executor or administrator, provided, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to extend to the case of a testamentary guardian."
The report of the commissioners who prepared the code in referring to
this Fection said: "The .provislons of this section are new to our law, but
they exist in the codes of some of our sister States, and we submit that the
interests of minors will be promoted by confining the office of guhrdian to such
persons as are likely to exercise a due supervision of the accounts of the executor or the administrator." 2 Rhone 234-235.
In this case three of the four residuary legatees are of full age and otherwise competent to act, and it seems to us there is little or no doubt that
the right belongs to the legatee, L. Mansiug, nominated by the other two; it
is not like the case where all of the residuary legatees are minors and they
ask to have a substitute appointed, during their minority; in which case the
guardian of the one named as executor would be invested with the right to
administer. But in this case, under the will, the three elder brothers are
entitled equally to a share of the residue, with the minor named as the executor, and being brothers of, and in the same class with the minor executor.
they are therefore under sec. 22 of act of 1832 entitled to letters of administration, any one separately and alone, or more than on.e jointly, as the register in his discretion shall judge will best administer the estate.
Further, it was the intention of the commissioners who prepared the code
and they so stated in their report, in reference to section six of the act of
Mar. 29th, 1832, to keep the offices of guardian and administrator separate and distinct and, except in the casA of a testamentary guardian, in differ.
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ent persons, so that the best interests of all would be subserved, by having
one keep a check, and exercise a supervision over the other, and thus serve
the best intersts of both the legatees and the ward. From this we would
infer that the guardian, for still another reason, would not be entitled to
letters of administration, for he Nouid not come within the 23rd section of
the act of 1832," that it siall be lawlul for the register to grant administration as aforesaid to any fit person or persons" for the guardian would not under the sixth section of the act of Mar. 29th, 1832, as quoted above, be a fit
person, as he is precluded by the act from being appointed administrator
while he is guardian.
The right to administer is predicatcd upon the ground of Interest in the
cstato as heir, legatee, or creditor. Ellmaker's Estate, 4 Watts 34. The
guardian is not qualified in any oZ these requirements, his interest being
rather adverse.
Within the class first entitled Lo administration the law leaves the seletion to the register. Levan's appeal, 17 W. N. C. 289, and the register having exercised his discretion within the class, a sound discretion will be presume( in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Appeal dismissed and decree of register sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The right of a minor executor, to act, is postponed until his arrival at
majority, in the Interim, another must administer the estate. The 23d section of the act of March 15th, 1832; enacts that "it shall be lawful for the
register to grant administration as aforesaid [that is administration with the
w!ll annexed] to any other fit person,- that is any fit person, other than the
minor named as executor in the will.
The 22nd section had prescribed the grant of letters of administration In
cases of intestacy, according to the situaticn of the family, to the surviving
husband, or widow, or one or more of the persons entitled to the personal
estate. When all such persons are incompetent or refuse to act, the register Is directed to grant the letters to one or more creditors, "or to any fl"
person at his discretion." A fit person is contrasted with one who is both entitled and fit. We think It was not tho intention of the legislature to recognize tWe right of any body to be appointed administrator durante niore aetate.
"An other fit person" may be appointed. The discretion of the register, oV
shoula that be abused, the orphans' cort, must decide what fit person shall
be chosen. "This sort of administration" says Williams, "has been frequently he!d not to be within the statute of 21 Hen. VIII c. 5. And consequently,
it is discretionary In the court to gra.t it to such persons as it shall think
fit." 1 Williams, Exec. 578. WhIle It is added that, in the exercise of this
discretion, It was the practice of the Spiritual Court to grant the administration to the guardian whom the court had a right by law to appoint, It Is said
that there are many instances where zbat court hhs granted administration
to persons not guardians of the mincr, and refused to grant it to persons
nominated by them. Rogers, J., remarks, in Ellmaker's Estate, 4 W. 34,that
all temporary administrations are equally out of the statutes of 31 Edw.3,
and 21 Henry VIII. and "in such adm:nistrations, the ordinary Is not boun 4
to grant them to thd n.ext of kin. Nor can I believe that the legislature, 1.
the act of 1832, intended to restrict, in this particular, the right of election
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which the register had under thcse statutes." It is said in 1 Woerner, Administrations, 433, that In administrations durante minoritate, the grant "is
usually, [i.e. in the various American states] to the guardian of the minor, but the section is entirely within the P,3und discretion of the court.'
That it is not the policy of Pennsylvania that the same person shall be
both guardian and executor or adminisrator, is clear from the 6th section
of the act of March 29th, 1832. which forbids the appointment of any executor or administrator as guardian. Guardians, p. 34. This policy would be
subverted, if guardians might be appointed administrators, even for a short
period.
The second proviso of the 22nd szction of the act of March 29th, 1832 dtxects that "in all cases of an administration with the will annexed, where
there is a general residue of the estate bequeathed, the right to administer
shall belong to those having the right to such residue, and the administration in such case, shall be granted by the register, to such one or more of
,hew as he shall judge will best administer the estate." This, we apprehend,
as we have indicated, has no reference to a provisional temporary administration, or, at least, to one durante irnn-orilate, for which the following section makes provision. But, if it did refer to administration during minority,
it is clear that under it, the register must grant the temporary letters,
either to the three other residuary legatees or to one or more of them, selected by him. On the nomination of two nf them, he has selected the third and
oldest, deeming that the one selected "will best administer the cstate."
Appeal dismissed.
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Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon this work. It consists of a
series -of essays; The Brief on Appeal by Prof. Redfield. How to use Decisions and Statutes, by Prof. Wambaugh;
American Law Publications
by A. F. Mason. of West Publishing Company, and How to Find the Law,
by Prof. Wheeler. Following these is a list of Abbreviations of the names
of Rerorts. The third of these essay., gives an interesting account of important law publications. Prof. Wambaugh's essay Is of high scientific
value. Prof. Wheeler expounds the analysis and classification of law and
the leading legal concepts. The work is worthy of the careful perusal of
every student of law and of every lawyer, and the table of Abbreviations
should be kept constantly within reach.

